This paper estimates the price of ethics by studying the risk-return relation in socially responsible investment (SRI) funds. Consistent with investors paying a price for ethics, SRI funds in many European and Asia-Pacific countries strongly underperform domestic benchmark portfolios by about 5% per annum, although UK and US SRI funds do not significantly underperform their benchmarks. The underperformance of SRI funds does not seem to be driven by the loadings on an ethical risk factor. SRI funds do not suffer a cost of reduced selectivity nor do SRI funds managers time the market. There is mixed evidence of a smart money effect: SRI investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform in the future, whereas they show some fund-selection ability in identifying ethical funds that will perform poorly. The screening activities of SRI funds have a significant impact on funds' riskadjusted returns and loadings on risk factors: corporate governance and social screens generate better risk-adjusted returns whereas other screens (e.g. environmental ones) yield significantly lower returns.
Introduction
"The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else." -- Aristotle, written around 350 B.C. 1 Although economics textbooks tell us that human behavior is driven by maximization of self-interest, many people deviate from exclusively selfish behavior (see, e.g., Gachter, 2000 and 2002) . For example, recent experimental evidence indicates that altruism or selflessness, is a powerful feature of human behavior and is unique to humans. 2 An individual's utility partially depends on the utility of other members of the community, and ethical and social considerations may be important determinants of economic behavior. 3 Economic theories of social norms (see Akerlof, 1980, and Romer, 1984) point out that, even when individuals maximize self-interest, social norms that are financially costly to the individual may nevertheless persist in the economy if individuals are sanctioned by loss of reputation when 1 The Nicomachean Ethics, Book I.5; in the translation by Ross (1980) . 2 Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) argue that human societies represent an anomaly in the animal world (): they are based on a detailed division of labor and cooperation between genetically unrelated individuals in large groups. 3 In fact, economics was for a long time seen as a branch of ethics (see Sen, 1987) . For example, Adam Smith was a Professor of Moral Philosophy. disobeying the norm. 4 Using a repeated game framework, Bovenberg (2002) formalizes various roles of social norms and values in facilitating economic cooperation, and argues that social considerations of corporate stakeholders (including consumers, employees, shareholders, etc.) may induce corporations to care for public goods, like the natural environment, even though this does not yield a direct benefit to the stakeholders themselves.
In this paper, we study the economic effects of ethics by focusing on the moneymanagement industry. Over the past decade, ethical mutual funds, or often also called socially responsible investment (SRI) funds, have experienced an explosive growth around the world: the assets in the socially screened portfolios reached $2.3 trillion in 2005 or approximately 9.4% of the total universe of professionally managed assets in the US (Social Investment Forum, 2005) .
SRI funds screen their investment portfolio based on ethical, social, corporate governance or environmental criteria. This provides an ideal setting to study the economic effects of ethics for the following reasons. First, investors of SRI funds explicitly deviate from the economically rational goal of wealth-maximization. SRI investors are socially conscious and derive nonfinancial utility by holding assets consistent with their ethical and social values. Second, by investing in mutual funds rather than giving money to charity, SRI investors still desire to improve their financial utility as they expect positive risk-adjusted returns on their investments. This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we study the risk and return characteristics of SRI funds using a unique dataset consisting of nearly all SRI mutual funds around the world (the United States, Europe, Asia-Pacific and Africa). To our best knowledge, this is the first study on the performance of SRI funds around the world. In order to pursue social objectives, SRI funds employ a set of investment screens that restrict their investment opportunities. On the one hand, the exclusion of companies based on SRI screens may constrain the risk-return optimization and negatively influence fund performance. For instance, SRI funds typically do not invest in 'sin' stocks, i.e. public-traded companies involved in producing alcohol or tobacco and in gambling, although these stocks have historically outperformed the market (see Hong and Kacperczyk, 2005) . On the other hand, the screening process of SRI funds may generate value-relevant non-public information and yield superior fund performance. The SRI screens are usually also used as filters to identify managerial competence and superior corporate governance, or to avoid potential costs of corporate social crises and environmental disasters. Specifically, we examine whether or not the risk-adjusted returns of the various types of SRI funds are different from those of conventional benchmarks.
We add an 'ethics factor' to the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model and to the conditional models in which a lagged set of macro-economic variables are included. The cost of reduced diversification is captured by various measures of net selectivity of stocks. We also study how returns and risk evolves over time and whether SRI fund managers time the market.
Second, we investigate whether or not ethical investors are able to select the SRI funds that will generate superior performance in subsequent periods (a smart money effect). Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2003) show that the fund selection process of SRI investors determines the performance of the SRI fund portfolios relative to that of conventional portfolios. While this study assumes that investors make fund selection decisions in a Bayesian way based on a fund's past performance, expenses and turnover, a number of other financial and non-financial fund attributes may significantly influence SRI investors' decision process (see Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang, 2006) . We contribute to this line of research and examine the performance of SRI investors' portfolios by tracking the actual asset allocation decisions of investors (i.e. the decisions to invest or withdraw money) instead of making assumptions on investors' fund selection process.
Third, we study the impact of SRI screens on fund returns and risk loadings, an issue that plays a central role in the SRI fund industry but has not yet been explored in the literature. More specifically, we analyze the question whether or not screening intensity and screening criteria (i.e. sin, ethical, social, corporate governance, and environmental screens) influence the riskadjusted returns and risk exposure of SRI funds. Simultaneously, we examine the impact of other fund characteristics, such as fund size, age, the fee structure and the reputation of fund families, on fund returns and risk.
The paper yields many interesting conclusions on SRI mutual funds; we summarize the main findings: First, the risk-adjusted returns of the average SRI fund in the UK and US are not statistically different from those of non-SRI funds in these countries. In contrast, the average SRI fund in most European and Asia-Pacific countries strongly underperforms the benchmark portfolios. In particular, the risk-adjusted returns of the average SRI funds in Belgium, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Singapore, and Sweden are on average lower than -5% per annum.
These results may reflect the impact of ethical considerations on stock prices: firms meeting high ethical standards are overpriced by the market and investors in these companies pay a price for ethics. It seems that investors are not doing that well by doing good. In addition, we demonstrate that the explanatory power of the Fama-French-Carhart risk factors has increased significantly over time for SRI fund returns. This suggests that SRI funds gradually converge to conventional funds by holding similar assets in their portfolios. When we extend the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model with an ethics factor, we confirm that the SRI funds have a higher exposure to this ethics factor. However, the difference between five-and four-factor alphas of SRI funds is economically small. In terms of the costs of diversification (net selectivity), SRI and conventional funds are not significantly different.
Second, we find mixed results on the 'smart money' effect in the SRI fund industry:
although ethical investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform their benchmarks in subsequent periods, there is some fund-selection ability to identify the ethical funds that will perform poorly. Meanwhile, we document that the risk-adjusted return of the total wealth invested in ethical funds in Europe (excluding the UK) and the Rest of World is about -6% per annum.
Third, the performance of SRI funds increases with the number of SRI screens employed to model their investment universe, and is better when funds have an in-house SRI research team to screen their portfolios. A two standard-deviation increase in the SRI screening intensity generates 2.6% abnormal returns per annum. The use of corporate governance and social screens increases the alpha in a four-factor model by 2.1%. These results support the hypothesis that the screening process generates value-relevant non-public information, and SRI screens help fund managers to pick stocks. It also appears that screening activities of SRI funds have a significant impact on funds' loadings on risk factors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data on SRI funds, investment screens and performance benchmarks. Section II presents the returns and risk characteristics of SRI funds and Section III focuses on the investors' portfolios of SRI funds, more specifically the smart money effect. While Section IV examines the determinants of returns and risk of SRI funds, Section V concludes.
I SRI Funds, Investment Screens and Performance Benchmarks

I.A Ethical and Conventional Mutual Funds
We construct a database that contains socially responsible equity mutual funds domiciled in 23 countries and offshore jurisdictions. Specifically, the SRI funds are domiciled in the To determine the universe of SRI funds, we create a list of mutual funds which are labelled as 'ethical', 'socially responsible', 'ecology', 'christian values' or 'islamic' in the databases above mentioned. S&P classifies mutual funds as ethical or socially responsible investment funds if the fund managers specify in the fund prospectuses that they have social, environmental, corporate governance, or ethical investment goals. We subsequently verify the SRI screening policies of these funds. For each fund in our initial sample, we hand-collect the information on SRI screens using the fund prospectuses and websites, and also gather more information by direct contact with fund managers (by phone, by email or via on-site interviews).
Furthermore, we also collect information on whether a fund engages in shareholder activism and whether the fund bases its screening activities on an in-house SRI research team. Hence, in order to be included in our sample, the SRI funds employ at least one ethical, corporate governance, social, or environmental screen as part of their investment policies.
When a mutual fund is sold in two or more countries, the S&P list of socially responsible funds reports it as two or more funds. We exclude such double counting and also restrict our sample to equity mutual funds, excluding fixed-income, balanced, and money-market mutual funds. We also do not include funds that are not available to individual investors directly, but are only available through institutions such as pension funds, insurance companies, or charities and foundations. The above filtering process reduces our sample size to 455 equity SRI funds, including 45 funds for which we do not have data on their assets under management. In addition, we learnt from discussions with several industry experts and fund managers that over our sample period eight socially responsible equity mutual funds ceased to exist, which implies a very low attrition rate (on average 0.25% on an annual basis). To avoid a possible survivorship bias (see Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross, 1992) , we collect data for these funds from a number of sources including CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund Database and the Datastream 'dead' 
I.B Social and Ethical Objectives
The SRI funds usually employ a combination of negative or positive SRI screens in the process of constructing portfolios. A typical negative screen is applied to an initial asset pool, such as the S&P 500 stocks from which specific sectors (e.g. alcohol, tobacco and defense industries), are excluded. Positive screens are employed to select companies meeting superior standards on issues such as corporate governance or environmental protection. The use of positive screens is often combined with a 'best in class' approach: firms are ranked within each industry based on social criteria; subsequently, only those firms passing a minimum threshold in each industry are selected as potential candidates for inclusion into a portfolio. For instance, the chemical firms polluting least are selected as candidates for SRI portfolios. Moreover, in order to achieve social objectives, SRI funds sometimes engage in shareholder activism, where fund managers attempt to influence the company's actions through direct dialogue with the management or by voting at annual general meetings. 9
We develop a list of SRI screens used by SRI funds around the world. Combining the information from a variety of data sources 10 , we identify 21 screening criteria, which are further classified into four major categories. As reported in Panel A of 
I.C Benchmarks
We construct monthly returns of benchmark portfolios for each country and region in our sample. The benchmark factors are the Fama and French's (1993) three factors, including the market, size, and book-to-market, and the Carhart's (1997) momentum factor. We collect the four factors for the US from the CRSP database. As risk-free interest rates, we use the 1-month treasury-bill rate or the inter-bank interest rate, gathered from CRSP and Datastream. Given that the factor returns for countries other than the US are not publicly available, we construct the factors for all other countries and regions in our sample using the Worldscope database 11 . For the excess market return factor (MKT) we use the return of a value-weighted portfolio of all stocks (including live and dead companies) in the Worldscope database in each country or region minus the risk-free rate. 13 The size factor SMB (Small minus Big) is the return difference between portfolios of small and large stocks. In line with Fama and French (1993) , we rank all stocks in a country or region based on the market value and assign the stocks with a total market capitalization below the median to the small stock portfolio and the ones with a market cap above the median to the large stock portfolio. To construct the book-to-market factor HML (High minus Low), we rank all stocks in the Worldscope database based on their book-to-market ratios, and assign the top 30% to the high book-to-market portfolio and the bottom 30% to the low book-to-market portfolio. The HML factor return is the return difference between the high and low book-to-market portfolios. To form the momentum factor UMD (Up minus Down), we rank all stocks according to their returns over the prior 12 months, and assign the top 30% stocks to the high prior return portfolio and the bottom 30% to the low prior return portfolio. The return difference between the high and low prior return portfolios is the UMD factor return. All of the three factors SMB, HML and UMD are value-weighted and constructed using 1-month lagged information. Following Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) , the SMB and HML factors are rebalanced at the end of June of each year, and the UMD factor is rebalanced at the end of each month.
To check the accuracy of our factor returns, we compare our UK factors with those in Dimson, Nagel and Quigley (2003) who construct the UK factors for the period of 1995-2001 11 For the construction of the factor portfolios, we used the on-line research tool provided by Style Research Ltd., London. 12 We also used the MSCI country indices as a proxy for the market portfolio, and our results remain unchanged. The Worldscope database aims at covering about 98% of market capitalization in each country, while the MSCI indices target 85% of free-floated market capitalization. 13 When we use the MSCI country indices as a proxy for the market portfolio, our results remain unchanged. The Worldscope database aims at covering about 98% of market capitalization in each country, while the MSCI indices target 85% of free-floated market capitalization. using the London Share Price Database (LSPD) 14 . We also construct the US factors using the Worldscope database and compare it with the Fama and French factors in the CRSP database.
We find that our own factors are virtually identical to those from these other sources.
II
Returns and Risk
II.A Doing Well by Doing Good?
In order to investigate whether or not investors (literally) pay a price for their ethical and social considerations, we examine the risk and return characteristics of SRI mutual funds around the world and compare this to reference groups of conventional US and UK funds. Most existing research on SRI fund performance does not find evidence for the hypothesis that the riskadjusted returns of the average SRI mutual funds differ significantly from those of the average non-SRI mutual funds. 15 In a model that considers the stock price implications of ethical investing that excludes polluting companies, Heinkel, Krause and Zechner (2001) show that the exclusion of polluting firms (or other unethical firms) by ethical investors reduces risk-sharing opportunities among investors who hold shares of polluting firms, which may negatively influence the stock price of polluting firms and raise their expected returns. 16 In line with this prediction, Hong and Kacperczyk (2005) find that 'sin' stocks in the US have been significantly underpriced by the stock market. The authors argue that the mispricing of 'sin' stocks may result from the fact that they are neglected by an important part of investors, i.e. the SRI investors. 17
As a result, excluding this underpriced 'sin' part of the stock market (which most of the ethical funds do), may negatively influence the risk-return tradeoffs of SRI funds in comparison to conventional funds. 14 We thank Elroy Dimson and Stefan Nagel for providing us with the UK factor data. 15 Almost all existing studies on SRI fund performance focus on individual countries (mainly the US and the UK). For instance, Goldreyer et al. (1999) , Hamilton et al. (1993) and Statman (2000) , Geczy et al. (2003) , Bello (2005) and Girard et al. (2005) study US SRI funds; Luther et al. (1992) , Luther and Matatko (1994) , Mallin et al. (1995) and Gregory et al. (1997) and Kreander et al. (2005) for European funds. As most of these studies are based on different sample periods, benchmarks and methodologies, international comparisons are difficult to make. 16 Implicit in this model is that there is limited arbitrage in the stock market, e.g. there is not enough arbitrage capital exploiting the mispricing between polluting firms and non-polluting firms. This model is in line with Merton's (1987) prediction that stocks with a smaller investor base (labeled as 'neglected' stocks) have a larger expected return due to limited risk-sharing. 17 The alternative explanation for the outperformance of 'sin' stocks is that sin companies are more liable to lawsuits (e.g. tobacco companies) and have higher expected return because of litigation risk.
We study the performance of ethical funds by using the time-series returns of an equally weighted portfolio of ethical funds. 18, 19 We first estimate the CAPM model:
where t r is the return of an equally weighted portfolio of funds in month t, t f r , is the return on a local risk-free deposit (i.e. the 1-month treasury bill rate or the inter-bank interest rate), m t r is the return of a local equity market index, 1 α is Jensen's alpha introduced by Jensen (1968), MKT β is the factor loading on the market portfolio, and t ε stands for the idiosyncratic return. We also estimate a four-factor model including the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors (see, Fama and French, 1993, and Carhart, 1997) : In order to control for the impact of fund fees on fund performance, we compute the alphas of fund portfolios both after and before deducting management fees (denoted as 4 , and gross 4 respectively). The gross alpha is calculated by adding back one twelfth of annual management fees to the monthly fund returns before estimating the four-factor model.
[Insert Table 3 about here] 18 We evaluate the performance of the fund portfolios on a country and regional basis from a local investor perspective: the country portfolios of mutual funds are in local currency, evaluated against local benchmark factors while using local risk-free interest rates. In addition, the portfolios 'Europe excluding UK' and 'Rest of World' are in Euro and US dollar and are evaluated against European and Asia-Pacific benchmark factors and the German and Australian risk-free rates, respectively. The 'World' portfolios are appraised from the perspective of an international investor based in the US: these portfolios are in US dollars and they are evaluated using the World benchmark factors and the US risk-free rate. As a robustness check, we also assess fund performance from the perspective of an international investor by using international indices as benchmarks; our main results remain unchanged (tables are available upon request). 19 As a robustness check, we also estimate the models using a fund regression approach: we compute the crosssectional mean of individual fund estimates. These results are similar to the results from the portfolio regression approach presented in our paper. For example, using the fund regression approach, we find that the estimated fourfactor alphas of conventional UK and US funds are -0.9% and -2.4% per annum, respectively. Table 3 presents the excess returns (i.e. fund returns in excess of the risk-free rate) and the CAPM results for equally weighted portfolios of ethical and conventional funds.
Panel A of
The average excess return of SRI funds around the world is 2.6% per annum (in USD), ranging from -0.7% per annum in the Rest of World to 5.2% per annum in the US. After controlling for the exposure to the market risk, the average SRI funds in the UK, the US and Continental
Europe underperform local equity indices by 2.7%, 2.8%, and 4.3% per annum, respectively.
However, the alphas for the UK and US SRI funds are not statistically different from those of their conventional peers, a result consistent with previous studies on SRI performance (see, e.g., Bauer, Koedijk and Otten, 2005) .
The estimation results for the four-factor model are presented in Panels B (regional level) and C (country level) of Table 3 . The annual alphas of SRI funds in the UK and US are -2.2%
and -3.4% respectively (both significant at the 1% level), whereas those of conventional funds are -1.1% and -2.5% respectively. 20 The differences in alphas, about 1% per annum, are not statistically significant. It is also important to note that 97% of the return variations of the UK and US SRI funds can be replicated by portfolios mimicking the four risk factors, which suggests that the holdings of SRI funds in these two countries might be very similar to those of conventional funds tracking style indices. European SRI funds underperform the four-factor benchmarks by 3.5% per annum (significant at the 10% level), which is less negative than the CAPM-adjusted alpha due to the negative loading on the 'HML' factor. Furthermore, the US SRI funds have a significantly smaller exposure to the size ('SMB') factor than the conventional funds. This implies that these SRI funds invest relatively more in large-capitalization stocks. In contrast, the SRI funds in other countries feature a 'small-cap growth stocks' investment style. 21
Panel C of Table 3 reports the performance of SRI funds at the country level from a domestic investor's perspective. The results are shown for countries with at least 5 years of return data. The four-factor alphas of most country portfolios are strongly negative, which indicates the strong underperformance of European and Asia-Pacific SRI funds relative to the four-factor benchmarks. For example, the alphas of the average SRI funds in Belgium, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Singapore, and Sweden are lower than -5% per annum.
As the underperformance of actively managed conventional funds may be due to management fees (see Gruber, 1996, and Wermers, 2000) , we examine the impact of management fees on SRI fund performance. Panel C of Table 3 shows that, even before deducting management fees from fund returns, about half of the country portfolios underperform the benchmarks by more than 3% per annum. This implies that the management fees cannot fully explain the strong underperformance of European and Asia-Pacific SRI funds relative to domestic benchmark portfolios.
To the extent that SRI funds invest in companies that are considered 'ethical', our results suggest that the companies meeting high ethical standards might be overpriced in stock markets, especially in Europe (excluding the UK) and Asia-Pacific. 22 There are two potential explanations for the 'overpricing of ethics' anomaly. The first is that ethical companies may be less risky than conventional ones and hence should earn a lower return. For instance, ethical companies may face fewer lawsuits relating to corporate governance scandals, corporate social crises and environmental disasters. In case the conventional four-factor pricing model does not capture SRI (or 'ethical') risks, the estimated alpha may reflect the expected returns associated with the missing risk factor. An alternative explanation for the overpricing of ethics may result from 'aversion to unethical/asocial corporate behavior': investors strongly dislike companies'
unethical behavior due to social norms even if the behavior is not associated with higher risks.
When deriving non-financial utility from investing in companies that meet high ethical standards, SRI investors may be content with a lower rate of return from ethical/socially responsible firms. The rising demand from shares of SRI firms may cause these firms to be priced above their fundamental value such that ethical funds underperform the market. 23 This explanation is a behavioral one, which assumes that there are limits to arbitrage in stock markets, i.e. there are not enough arbitrageurs short-selling ethical firms if they are overpriced.
II.B Does Ethical Risk Matter?
We investigate the relative importance of 'ethical risk' and 'aversion to unethical behavior' to explain the underperformance of ethical funds. If underperformance is driven by the missing ethical risk factor, adding this factor to the four-factor model could improve the alphas of ethical funds. 22 Alternative explanations for the underperformance of SRI funds may be transaction costs and non-stock holdings of funds. Wermers (2000) shows that, for conventional mutual funds in the US, transaction costs and the underperformance of non-stock holdings lead to a reduction in fund performance by 0.8% and 0.7% per annum respectively. Given that the gross alphas on SRI funds are far lower than -1.5%, these two factors are unlikely to explain the strong underperformance of SRI funds. 23 This view is related to taste-based theories of discrimination in labor markets, which originates from Becker (1957) . In this theory, employers with discriminatory tastes are willing to pay a financial price to avoid interacting with a particular class of people. Consequently the wage of a particular class of people (e.g. white people) may be higher than the wage of others. The 'aversion to unethical behavior' explanation is also in line with the fact that in product markets, consumers are willing to pay a premium for environmentally friendly products.
We measure the 'ethics' factor returns by employing ethical equity indices, i. We add the 'ethics' factor to the conventional four-factor model: 25
where 5 α is the five-factor-adjusted return of mutual fund portfolios, ethic t r captures the excess return of the regional ethical indices, 26 ETHIC β is the loading on the ethical risk factor, and t ε stands for the idiosyncratic return. We can also interpret ethic t r as a zero-investment spread that has a long position in ethical firms and a short position in a risk-free deposit. Pastor and Stambaugh's (2002) framework of mutual fund performance evaluation, where fund performance benchmarks include seemingly unrelated assets that are not captured by the benchmarks. 26 As the FTSE4G does not provide ethical indices for the Asia-Pacific region, we use excess returns of the FTSE4G Global Index as a proxy for the 'ethics' factor in the Rest of World.
Panel B of
funds, although the differences are not statistically significant. Third and most importantly, the difference between the five-and four-factor alphas of SRI funds is economically small, which is less than 0.5% per annum for ethical funds in the UK, US, Europe and the World. Given that ethical funds underperform the four-factor portfolios by more than 5% per annum in many countries, it implies that adding the 'ethics' risk factor to the four-factor model has only limited influence on the risk-adjusted returns of ethical funds. Consequently the underperformance of ethical funds seems not to be driven by ethical risk. These results support the hypothesis that investors pay a price for ethics due to 'aversion to unethical behavior', as ethical fund returns are much lower than what is required to compensate for risk.
II.C How Do Returns and Risk Evolve Over Time?
The SRI fund industry is a relatively young industry, as the average age of SRI funds in our sample is only 6 years (see Table 1 ). The industry may have experienced a learning phase during the early period of its development. Bauer et al. (2005) document that in early 1990's US and German SRI funds significantly underperform their conventional peers but this difference is gradually transformed into a slight out-performance during the late 1990's. In this subsection, we examine the evolution of SRI funds' returns and risk over time.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
We divide our sample period into three sub-samples: the pre-bubble period of 1991-1995, the internet bubble period of 1996-1999, and the post-bubble period of 2000-2003. We estimate the four-factor model (Eq. (2)) for the three sub-samples, and report the estimated alphas and the adjusted R-squared of the model in Panels A of 
where for the US. 27 These results support the hypothesis that the holdings of ethical funds become increasingly similar to those of conventional funds.
II.D Time-Varying Risk Loadings and Market Timing
So far, we have assumed that the risk loadings of SRI funds do not change systematically over time, i.e. the portfolio betas are not time-varying. However, fund managers may decide to vary the risk exposure of their portfolios under different macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, if fund managers have some 'market timing' abilities and hence some predictive power regarding the stock market evolution, they may increase funds' exposure to the stock market prior to a market increase and reduce the exposure prior to a market decline. We therefore investigate the impact of time-varying risk loadings on the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds, and thus examine market timing.
We employ a conditional model as introduced by Ferson and Schadt (1996) and assume that fund managers change the portfolio risk loadings as a rational response to publicly available macroeconomic information. By incorporating a lagged information set of macroeconomic variables in the four-and five-factor models (Eq. (2) and (3)), we estimate the following conditional four-and five-factor models (Eq. (5) and (6)) via OLS regressions:
where 1 − t z is a vector of four predetermined information variables, and b F , β is a vector of four response coefficients where F stands for MKT, SMB, HML or UMD. The predetermined information variables which have shown to be good predictors of stock returns (according to Ferson and Schadt, 1996) include: (i) the one-month inter-bank interest rate or the treasury bill rate, (ii) the dividend yield of the value-weighted local market indices, (iii) the bond termstructure premium measured by the ten-year government bond yield minus the one-month treasury bill rate, and (iv) the bond credit-risk premium measured by the corporate bond yield minus the ten-year government bond yield (or, for the US, the Moody's BAA rated bond yield minus the Moody's AAA rated bond yield). These information variables for each country are If a mutual fund manager increases the fund's exposure to the market prior to a market increase or reduces the market exposure prior to a market decline, the fund's returns are a convex function of the market returns. To test this market-timing ability of the managers of SRI funds, we employ the Treynor and Mazuy's (1966) measure by adding a quadratic term of the market premium to the conditional four-factor model (Eq. (5)):
where the coefficient on the quadratic term ( TM γ ) measures a fund manager's market-timing ability based on private information. A positive TM γ implies that the fund's returns are a convex function of the market returns even after controlling for time-varying risk loadings based on publicly available macroeconomic information.
[Insert Table 6 about here] Panel A of Table 6 reports estimation results for the conditional four-and five-factor alphas ( C , 4 α and C , 5 α ) and the market-timing coefficient ( TM γ ). First, we find that the conditional four-or five-factor alphas across all regions are very similar to the alphas of the unconditional models (of Table 3, Panel B and Table 4 , Panel B). This implies that allowing for time-varying risk loadings has little impact on our results on SRI fund performance. An interesting difference with the unconditional results is that the four-factor conditional alpha of SRI funds in the US is lower than those of conventional US funds by 1.6% per annum (significant at the 10% level). Second, there is little evidence that SRI fund managers in the UK, US and Continental Europe have some market timing ability, a result that is consistent with most studies on conventional mutual funds. 29 In addition, we find that SRI fund managers in the Rest of World exhibit significantly negative 'market timing' ability, which implies that they time the market in the wrong direction.
II.E Is Inadequate Diversification of Risk Costly?
Active portfolio management may imply that by actively selecting securities that are undervalued, portfolio managers give up part of the diversification potential of their portfolios.
Investors in actively managed funds bear more idiosyncratic risk relative to investors in passive assets such as market portfolios. Compared to conventional funds, SRI funds face an additional set of constraints on their investment opportunities: the SRI screens. We therefore study whether or not the SRI screening activities bring about a cost to investors in terms of reduced diversification of idiosyncratic risk.
We measure the welfare costs of inadequate diversification by investors' opportunity costs of bearing idiosyncratic risk using the following two specifications. First, following Fama (1972), we measure systematic risk and define the costs of inadequate diversification as: We also extend the Fama's (1972) measure by using the four-factor model as the
where σ is the standard deviation of portfolio excess returns, b t r is the return of a zeroinvestment portfolio consisting of the four benchmark assets with factor loadings resulting from regressing excess fund returns on factor returns ) ) ( ( In case SRI fund investors bear more idiosyncratic risk than conventional fund investors (e.g. due to SRI screens), SRI investors may require an additional return to compensate the opportunity costs of bearing idiosyncratic risk. We calculate the Fama's (1972) measure of fund performance by subtracting the welfare costs of inadequate diversification from the funds' riskadjusted returns, which is labeled as 'Net Selectivity' (NS). More specifically, Net Selectivity is defined as the funds' risk-adjusted returns (i.e. the sum of the alpha and idiosyncratic returns, denoted as t ε α + ) in excess of the welfare costs of bearing idiosyncratic risk (Div). The NS has the following two specifications:
It is straightforward to see that the Net Selectivity also equals the portfolio excess return ( t f t r r , − ) minus the risk premium for σ units of portfolio risk. Table 6 shows the estimation results for both the original Fama's specification and the extended specification of net selectivity. The welfare costs of inadequate diversification (Div) relative to either the one-factor or four-factor benchmarks are economically small (i.e. between 0.1% and 0.5% per annum) for ethical funds across the regions, and they are not statistically significant (except in the US). The differences in diversification costs between ethical funds and conventional funds are also not statistically significant for the UK and US. Furthermore, after adjusting for the opportunity costs of taking avoidable risk, the performance measures of net selectivity are similar to our previous results of one-factor and four-factor alphas (see Table 3 ). The differences in net selectivity between ethical funds and conventional funds are not statistically significant. These results suggest that the SRI screening activities do not impose welfare costs to investors in terms of inadequate risk diversification. This is consistent with the classic view that a well-diversified portfolio does not require a large number of stocks 30 , and implies that SRI constraints have little influence on the diversification of idiosyncratic risk.
Panel B of
III Is There A 'Smart Money' Effect?
The performance of the average SRI fund is not necessarily useful information for investors who can selectively invest in a subset of SRI funds. Previous studies document a 'smart money' effect in the conventional mutual fund industry as investors seem to be able to make smart decisions by selecting ex ante the mutual funds that will turn out to be outperformers (see e.g., Gruber, 1996, and Zheng, 1999) . In other words, even though active portfolio management on average may not add value, money may be smart in selecting the funds that will perform well in the future. 31 We therefore study whether or not such a smart money effect exists in the ethical fund industry.
The fund selection process of ethical investors determines the performance of the selected SRI funds relative to a conventional fund portfolio. For instance, Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2003) show that, for an investor who believes that stock returns are generated by the four-factor model, the SRI mutual funds that she selects underperform the non-SRI funds by 3.6% per annum. In contrast, ethical investors who believe in managerial skill pay a large financial cost of more than 12% per annum in terms of risk-adjusted returns. That study assumes that investors make fund selection decisions in a Bayesian way, namely that they take into account the funds' past performance, expenses and turnover. Moreover, a number of financial and non-financial fund attributes significantly influence investors' decision process and, consequently, the money flows to SRI funds (Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang, 2006) .
Rather than making assumptions on fund selection process, we construct portfolios of SRI funds by tracking the actual fund selection decisions by investors (i.e. the decisions of investing versus withdrawing money). More specifically, we employ Zheng's (1999) 31 An alternative explanation for the smart money effect is the momentum effect of stock returns: Sapp and Tiwari (2005) show that investors chase the mutual funds that performed well in the past. Such funds may perform well in subsequent periods due to the returns momentum rather than investors' fund selection abilities. After controlling for the momentum effect in return regressions, the smart money effect disappears. 32 In addition, we also define Flow in month t (Flow t ) as the growth rate of fund assets under management (AUM) beyond fund asset appreciation: Flow t = Cash Flow t /AUM t-1 . in the inflow portfolio and going short in the outflow portfolio yields economically and statistically significant alphas of 5.5% (and more specifically of 4.7% and 11.6% for ethical funds from the US and the Rest of World, respectively), where the abnormal returns are driven by the significant underperformance of outflow portfolios. We also note that, in line with Sapp and Tiwari's (2005) findings, such a significant difference in alphas between the inflow and outflow portfolios does not exist for conventional funds in the UK and US.
Second, we repeat the above analysis to the High-flow and Low-flow portfolios.
Comparing the alphas of the two portfolios, we find that ethical investors are unable to identify the good performers as none of the High-flow portfolios of SRI funds have significantly positive alphas. There is some evidence that ethical investors have some ability to identify poorly performing funds ex ante, especially in the UK and US. However, these results are weaker than for the cash-flow weighted portfolios.
Third, the results on the performance of the Average portfolio suggest that the performance of ethical money invested in European (excluding the UK) and the Rest of World funds is poor. The value-weighted average SRI funds in these regions significantly underperform the factor-mimicking strategies by 5.6% and 6.2% per annum respectively, implying that the total wealth invested in ethical funds is reduced by about 6% per annum on a risk-adjusted basis. Meanwhile, it is important to note that part of the underperformance is due to the fact that ethical funds charge management fees of about 1.5% per annum (see Table 1 ).
The net transfer of wealth, from ethical investors to their fund managers, implies that investing in socially responsible funds might be not a socially optimal way of committing to ethical considerations. 34
Taken together, we find mixed results in terms of the existence of a smart money effect in the SRI fund industry: although ethical investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform the benchmark factors in the future, they have some fund-selection ability to identify the ethical funds that will perform poorly. In addition, the aggregate performance of money invested in ethical funds, especially in Europe (excluding the UK) and the Rest of World, is significantly lower than the benchmarks.
IV
Determinants of Returns and Risk
While we have shown the return and risk characteristics of portfolios of SRI funds in Sections II and III, we now explore the cross-sectional differences between SRI funds and investigate the determinants of returns and risk of SRI funds around the world.
IV.A Determinants of Returns
In order to pursue their social objectives, SRI funds employ a set of investment screens that restrict the investment opportunities. While the exclusion of companies based on ethical, social, or environmental screens may constrain risk-return optimization, the use of screens can also be regarded as an active selection strategy aimed at generating superior fund performance.
Therefore, we include the number and type of SRI screens in our model explaining SRI funds' risk-adjusted returns. The performance of SRI funds may also relate to other fund characteristics, such as fund size, age, the fee structure and the reputation of the fund family. For instance, Chen et al. (2004) show that fund size erodes performance due to liquidity and organizational diseconomies, and that this relation is more pronounced for funds investing in small and illiquid stocks. Hence, our model of SRI fund returns around the world looks as follows:
Risk-adjusted Return i,t = 0 + 1 Screening Activity i + 2 Fund Characteristics i,t-1
where the Risk-adjusted Return i,t is the four-factor-adjusted return or the conditional four-factoradjusted return of fund i in month t. 35 For SRI funds, Screening Activity i comprises the following variables: (i) Number of Screens i is the number of SRI screens, listed in Table 2 [t-1,t-12] , the 35 The risk-adjusted return (in local currency) is defined as ε α + (of Eq. (2) and (5)) and is estimated for each individual fund using the benchmark factors and information variables in domestic countries. The four-factoradjusted returns are estimated for each fund with a return history of at least 24 months, while the conditional-modeladjusted returns and risk loadings are estimated for each fund with at least 60 months' returns. 36 These four indicator variables are not mutually exclusive; all may equal one in case a fund employs screens from each of the four main screening categories. total risk of the fund measured by the standard deviation of monthly fund returns for months t-1 to t-12, and (vii) Average Return i, [t-1,t-12] , the average return of fund i over months t-1 to t-12.
Subsequently, the Fund Family i,t-1 variables proxy for the reputation of fund families in the SRI or conventional fund industries: (i) D (Top Performer Family i, [Insert Table 8 about here] We report the estimation results of Equation (12) Table 10 presents a summary of the economic effects of Table 8 . First, we find that fund returns increase with screening intensity (proxied by the number of SRI screens applied). All else equal, funds with 8 more SRI screens (i.e. a two standard deviation difference) are associated with a 1.3% higher 4factor-adjusted return per annum. This finding supports the hypothesis that SRI criteria help fund managers to pick stocks. However, this effect disappears when we measure fund performance via the conditional 4-factor model. Funds employing a corporate governance and social screen can expect 2.1% higher annual returns (based on the conditional 4-factor model) than funds without such a screen, whereas funds employing an environmental screen are associated with 1.6% lower returns per annum. Furthermore, employing an in-house SRI 37 The estimation results of these time indicator variables are available upon request. research team increases the 4-factor adjusted return by 1.2% per annum. This finding supports the hypothesis that the screening process generates value-relevant non-public information.
Second, in line with Chen et al. (2004) , we find that fund size erodes the returns of both SRI and conventional funds, although the effect is economically insignificant. In addition, we find that fund age and risk reduce the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds, whereas total fund fees do not significantly affect the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds. Finally, after controlling for screening activities, fund characteristics and fund family reputation, the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds in Continental Europe and the Rest of World are about 4% lower (annually) than those of UK SRI funds.
IV.B Determinants of Risk
While in the previous subsection, we document that screening activities and other fund characteristics affect risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds, we now examine what determines SRI funds' risk loadings:
Risk Loading F i, t = 0 + 1 Screening Activity i + 2 Fund Characteristics i,t-1 + 3 Fund Family i,t-1 + 4 Economic Condition i,t-1 + Control Variables i,t + u i,t
where Risk Loading F ,i, t stands for the time-varying betas of fund i in month t for factor F which represents MKT, SMB, HML, or UMD. The risk loadings are estimated using Eq. (5) 
In addition to the Screening Activity i , Fund Characteristics i,t-1, Fund Family i,t-1 , and Control Variables i,t (defined above, Eq. (12)), we also include Economic Condition i,t-1 , a set of explanatory variables consisting of the four lagged information variables: the interest rate, the dividend yield, the bond term-structure premium and the bond credit-risk premium in domestic countries.
[Insert Tables 9 and 10 about here]
The estimation results of Eq. (13) are shown in Panels A (for SRI funds) and B (for conventional UK funds) of Table 9, while Panel B of Table 10 provides a summary of the economic effects of the results of Table 9 . First, we find that the screening activities of SRI funds have a significant impact on the risk loadings. All else equal, funds employing a sin screen have about 10% less exposure to the market, size and book-to-market factors than funds without such a screen. This implies that funds with sin screens adhere to investment styles focusing on low-betas, large-caps and growth. Corporate governance and social screens generate 13% higher loadings on large-cap stocks and 24% more exposure to growth stocks, whereas funds subject to environmental criteria have 8% higher loadings on value stocks. Interestingly, SRI funds adopting a policy of shareholder activism or employing an in-house SRI research team invest 10% more in value stocks.
We also show that the characteristics of mutual funds and fund families also affect the risk loadings of SRI funds. For instance, SRI funds with 1% higher fees invest 4% more in highbeta stocks, 7% more in small stocks and 4% more in value stocks. In addition, a one-standard deviation increase in total risk of SRI funds is associated with about 9% higher loadings on the market factor, and 8% more exposure to small-cap growth stocks. An interesting result is that SRI funds belonging to a fund family with top performers invest 4% more in small stocks, while those belonging to a leading family in the SRI market (in terms of the market share) invest 6% more in large-cap value stocks.
Finally, we find evidence that ethical fund managers respond to macroeconomic conditions by changing their funds' risk loadings. After a 1% increase in the average dividend yield, managers of SRI funds increase funds' exposure to small-cap growth stocks from 7% to 10%. When the credit-risk premium in the bond markets increases by 1%, SRI fund managers react to this news by investing about 8% more in (safer) large-cap value stocks.
V Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature of socially responsible investments as it studies the risk and return characteristics of nearly all SRI mutual funds around the world. Our main hypothesis is that ethical/social considerations influence the stock prices and that investors pay a price for the use of SRI screening of funds. The main reason why SRI investors are willing to pay such a price is based on an aversion to unethical/asocial corporate behavior. We investigate this hypothesis by focusing on the ethical/SRI mutual fund industry around the world. Investors of SRI funds explicitly deviate from the economically rational goal of wealth-maximization by pursuing social objectives.
Consistent with investors paying a price for ethics, SRI funds in many European and Asia-Pacific countries strongly underperform domestic benchmark portfolios. In particular, the average risk-adjusted returns of the SRI funds in Belgium, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Singapore, and Sweden are lower than -5% per annum. In addition, passive portfolios of European firms complying with ethical requirements, i.e. companies included in the European ethical indices, significantly underperform benchmark risk factors by about 4.5% per annum.
These results support our hypothesis that ethical considerations influence the stock prices and that ethical firms are overpriced by the market. We also show that the power of the Fama and
French's risk factors to explain the SRI fund returns has significantly increased over the past decade. This signifies that SRI funds gradually converge to conventional funds in terms of the holdings in their portfolios. We find no evidence that SRI funds managers are successfully timing the market nor that SRI funds suffer from a cost of reduced diversification.
We find mixed results in terms of the existence of a 'smart money' effect in the SRI fund industry: while there is some fund-selection ability in identifying poorly performing ethical funds, ethical investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform their benchmarks in subsequent periods. The return of total wealth invested in ethical funds in Europe (excluding the UK) and the Rest of World is merely -6% per annum on a risk-adjusted basis.
Our results on the determinants of SRI funds' returns and risk loadings suggest that the screening activities of SRI funds matter: funds with a higher number of SRI screens have better returns even after controlling for well-known risk factors. In particular, a two standard-deviation increase in the SRI screening intensity generates 2.6% abnormal returns per annum. In addition, employing an in-house research team on SRI issues increases fund returns by 1.2% per annum.
These results support the hypothesis that the screening process generates value-relevant nonpublic information and that SRI screens help fund managers to pick stocks. We also find that the use of specific screens, such as corporate governance and social screens, has a positive impact on the risk-adjusted returns (by 2.1% per annum) while other types of screens, e.g.
environmental ones, reduce the alpha by 1.6%. Table 1 reports the number of funds, the number of funds in a family (managed by the same financial institution), the age (years since the fund's inception), the Assets Under Management (in million ), and the annual expenses (fund management fees), load fees (the sum of front-end fees and back-end fees) and total fees (the sum of management fees and one seventh of load fees) per fund for SRI funds around the world at the end of 2003. Panel B reports the cross-sectional characteristics of our benchmark sample of non-SRI funds in the UK and the US. Table 2 reports the 21 investment screens used by SRI funds around the world which are classified into 4 broad categories. SRI funds often use a combination of the screens. Positive screens (funds select firms based on relative criteria) are in italics and the remaining screens are negative screens (funds exclude specific industries or firms). Panel B shows the number of screens per fund, the number of negative or positive screens, the number of sin, ethical, corporate governance and social, and environmental screens used. Furthermore, it reports the fraction of the funds that use negative, positive, sin, ethical, corporate governance and social, environmental or islamic screens, and of those that engage in shareholder activism or base their screening activity on in-house research, and the fraction of the funds that invest across Europe, the world or within their domestic countries. Table 3 presents the average excess return (i.e. fund return in excess of the risk-free interest rate) and the CAPM model estimates (Equation (1)) for equally weighted SRI funds around the world and for non-SRI funds in the UK and the US, and reports the differences in the estimates between SRI and non-SRI funds. Panel B presents the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model estimates (Equation (2)) for equally weighted SRI funds around the world and non-SRI funds in the UK and the US. The gross alphas are estimated by adding back one twelfth of annual management fees to the monthly fund returns before running the regressions. Panel C reports the four-factor model estimates (Equation (2)) and the gross alphas for equally weighted SRI funds in each country with at least five years of returns data. The returns of the country portfolios are in local currency and evaluated from a local investor's perspective, i.e. with local benchmark factors and local risk-free rates. The estimates of excess returns and alphas ( 1 and 4 ) are annualized. The t-statistics are in italics, calculated with Newey-West standard errors and lags of order three to account for autocorrelation and heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 10%.
No. Funds
No. Families
Mean
Panel A: Excess returns and the CAPM results
Excess Return (t-stat.) 53 -2.27 -0.40 -0.48 -0.80 Panel C: The Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model results (by country) Table 4 presents the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model estimates (Equation (2)) for returns of the FTSE 4 Good UK, US, Europe and World Indices. Panel B presents the estimates of a five-factor model (Equation (3)) for equally weighted SRI funds around the world and non-SRI funds in the UK and the US, and reports the differences in the estimates between SRI and non-SRI funds. The five-factor model includes an 'ethics' factor which consists of the excess returns of the FTSE 4 Good indices. The estimates of alphas ( 4 and 5 ) are annualized. The t-statistics are in italics, calculated with Newey-West standard errors and lags of order three to account for autocorrelation and heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 10%.
Panel A: Performance of ethical indices 4 (t-stat.) (2)) for the pre-bubble period of 1991-1995, the bubble period of 1996-1999 and the post-bubble period of 2000-2003 for equally weighted SRI funds around the world and non-SRI funds in the UK and the US. Panel A also reports the differences in the estimates between SRI and non-SRI funds. Panel B reports the sub-sample estimates of alphas and adjusted R-squared where the dependent variable is the return of equally weighted SRI funds and the independent variable is the return of equally weighted non-SRI funds in the UK and US respectively (Equation (4)).
The estimates of alphas are annualized. The t-statistics are in italics, calculated with Newey-West standard errors and lags of order three to account for autocorrelation and heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 10%. Panel A presents the conditional alphas in the conditional version of the four-and five-factor models (see Equation (5) and (6) and the 'market timing' coefficient in the conditional four-factor model (see Equation (7)) for equally weighted SRI funds around the world and non-SRI funds in the UK and the US. This panel also shows the differences in the estimates between SRI and non-SRI funds. Panel B presents the costs of inadequate diversification (Div 1 and Div 4 ) and net selectivity (NS 1 and NS 4 ), which were introduced by Fama (1972) (see Equations (8)- (11)), for equally weighted SRI funds around the world and Non-SRI funds in the UK and the US. The panel also reports the differences in the estimates between SRI and Non-SRI funds. The estimates of conditional alphas, diversification losses, and net selectivity are annualized. The t-statistics are in italics and are calculated with Newey-West standard errors and lags of order three to account for autocorrelation and heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 10%. (2)) for investors' portfolios of SRI funds around the world and Non-SRI funds in the UK and the US, and reports the differences in the estimates between SRI and Non-SRI funds. The investors' portfolios are the value-weighted average portfolios and four new money portfolios including the inflow (column A), outflow (column B), high-flow (column C) and low-flow (column D) portfolios which are constructed using past cash flow signals (described in Section II.C). The VW, CW and EW in brackets denote the value (assets under management)-weighted, cash-flow weighted, equally weighted portfolios, respectively. The table also reports the difference in the estimated alphas between the inflow and outflow portfolios (column A-B), and between the high-flow and low-flow portfolios ((column C-D). (2) and (5)) respectively. Individual fund returns are in local currency and evaluated from a local investor's perspective (i.e. using local benchmark factors and local risk-free rate). The independent variables include the following variables. Number of Screens i is the number of SRI screens employed, and D(Sin Screens i ),D(Ethical Screens i ),D(Governance & Social Screens i ) and D(Environmental Screens i ) are four dummies which equal 1 if the fund uses at least one of the main SRI screens. D(Islamic Fund i ) captures whether the fund is designed for islamic investors, D(Activism Policy i ) equals 1 if the fund aims at actively influencing corporate behaviour, and D(In-House SRI Research i ) equals 1 if the fund has inhouse SRI research. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of AUM in (Size i,t-1 ). Age is the number of years (Age i,t-1 ). We also include an interaction term of age and a dummy equalling 1 if the age is below the median of all SRI (or conventional) funds in its domicile (Age i,t-1 * D(Young i,t-1 )). Total Fees i is the sum of the annual management fee and 1/7 th of the sum of front-and the back-end load fees. We also include an interaction term of total fees and an dummy equalling 1 if the total fees are above the median total fees of all funds in the domicile (Total Fees i *D(High Fees i )). The total risk is the standard deviation of monthly fund returns (Risk i,t-1 )), and Average Return i, [t-1,t-12] is the average returns of fund i over the months t-1 to t-12. D(Top Performer Family i,t-1 ) equals 1 if the raw returns of at least one SRI (or conventional) fund in the funds' family belongs to the top 20% of all funds in its domicile. Number Funds Family i, t-1 is the number of SRI (or conventional) funds managed by the funds' family, D(Market Leader Family i,t-1 ) equals 1 if the funds' family has the highest market share in its domicile, D(European Diversification i ) and D(Global Diversification i ) equal 1 if the fund invests across Europe or globally. We include dummies based on the domicile of the fund (D(Europe ex. UK i ), D(US i ) and D(Rest of World i )), and 9 year dummies and 11 month dummies. The coefficients on indicator variables (denoted with a prefix "D") and the count variables (i.e. Constant, Age, Age *D Young, Number of Funds and Number of Screens) are multiplied by 100. The t-statistics are in Italics, calculated with White standard errors to account for heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 5%.
( Size (t-1) -0.000 -3.333 -0.000 -1.949 -0.001 -4.070 -0.000 -3.048 Age (t-1) -0.012 -2.507 -0.017 -3.873 0.003 1.799 0.002 1.583 Age (t-1) * D Young (t-1) 0.003 0.183 -0.029 -2.218 0.007 0.991 0.008 1.320 Total Fees -0.009 -0.173 -0.061 -1.063 -0.045 -0.857 -0.009 -0.183 Total Fees * D High Fees -0.046 -1.462 -0.058 -1.634 0.074 3.050 0.067 3.094 Risk (13)) for SRI funds (Panel A) and Non-SRI funds in the UK (Panel B). The dependent variable is the beta (i.e. the sum of time-constant and timevarying betas) of fund i in month t for factors MKT, SMB, HML or UMD in the conditional four-factor model as by Equation (5). Individual fund returns are in local currency and evaluated from a local investor's perspective (i.e. using local benchmark factors and local risk-free rate) for funds with at least five years' return history. The independent variables consist of variables capturing economic conditions including the one-month inter-bank interest rate or treasury bill rate (Interest Rate), the dividend yield of the value-weighted local market indices (Dividend Yield), a bond term-structure premium measured by the ten-year government bond yield minus the onemonth treasury bill rate (Term Structure Premium), and a bond credit-risk premium measured by corporate bond yield minus the ten-year government bond yield (or the Moody's BAA rated bond yield minus the Moody's AAA rated bond yield for the US) (Credit-Risk Premium). The t-statistics are in italics, calculated with White standard errors to account for heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 5%. This table summarizes the (annualized) economic effects of a standardized change (e.g. a change of one percent, an event (a dummy variable of 1), or a change of one standard deviation (1 S.D.)) in the explanatory variables (which are statistically significant at the 5% level) in Tables 8 and 9 .
Panel A: Determinants of risk-adjusted returns (in Table 8 
